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Abstract 
The past decade has witnessed a growing number of business models that facilitate economic 
exchanges between individuals with limited institutional mediation. One of the important innovative 
business models is online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, which has received widely attention from 
government, industry, investors, and researchers. Based on dual system framework and two-factor 
theory, this research proposes a research model to investigate the role of various signals from the 
P2P platform in affecting lender’s investment decisions. With data collected from PPDAI, a popular 
Chinese P2P lending site, we test the proposed model with logistic regression and hierarchical linear 
model. The results reveal that most of the factors perform significantly in lenders’ decision making. 
We also find the specific information of an auction itself is more important than borrower’s 
characteristics to a large degree. Finally, the research emphasizes that bid number performs well in 
moderating most of the relationships between variables. 
Keywords: Peer-to-peer lending, Dual system framework, Two-factor theory, Bid number. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed a growing number of business models that facilitate economic 
exchanges between individuals with limited institutional mediation. One of the important innovative 
business models in digital finance is online P2P lending, which have received widely attention from 
government, industry, investors, and researchers (Gonzalez & Loureiro 2014; Greiner & Wang 2010; 
Herzenstein, Dholakia, et al. 2011; Herzenstein, Sonenshein, et al. 2011; Lin et al. 2013; Yum et al. 
2012). P2P lending site is a new and innovative platform of financial transactions that bypasses 
conventional intermediaries by directly connecting borrowers and lenders (Yum et al. 2012). The first 
P2P lending platform Zopa was launched in 2005. Nowadays, P2P lending is dramatically gaining its 
popularity worldwide, such as Zopa in the UK, Prosper in the US, and PPDAI in China. This boom is 
powered by technology advance and rapidly changes customer behavior. The rise of P2P lending will 
bring new competition to the industry and propel the financial sector into a new era by integrating 
finance with the internet. 
Founded in 2007, PPDAI is the first online P2P lending platform in China. Like Prosper.com, PPDAI 
serves as an information dissemination platform with no offline business. It is the typical 
representative of pure intermediary and online service provider. To date, there are more than 600 
thousand registrants in this P2P lending site. The loan loss provision has reached more than 10 million 
RMB by the end of last month. The business mode for PPDAI makes the operation cost much lower 
than offline companies, so it can give more profit to lenders and borrowers for attracting more 
customers. The revenue of PPDAI mainly comes from service fee and compensate but with no 
guarantee for lender’s capital and bad debts expense risk. 
Although P2P lending markets enjoy rapid development in recent years, this business model is not 
developing without problem. One of the most important problems is information asymmetry (Lin et al. 
2013; Yum et al. 2012). One of the ways to solve this problem may be taking advantage of a portfolio 
that consists of a large number of microloans with diverse risk levels, but with an inherent risk of 
default on loans made via the online medium to strangers without collateral (Yum et al. 2012). 
For a P2P marketplace to flourish, it is important to examine how lenders make their decisions 
(Greiner & Wang 2010; Lin et al. 2013). In particular, if diverse information is presented on the P2P 
lending platform as signals, how will those signals process and interpret by different lenders? To 
answer this question, we propose a research framework to categorize different signals sent by the 
platform and investigates their roles in affecting lenders’ decisions. Building upon dual system 
framework and two-factor theory, we investigate how lenders process different information and test 
the relationship between different information signals and lender’s choices. Past literature has applied 
dual system framework to human decision making (Dhar & Gorlin 2013; Djulbegovic et al. 2012; 
Gerrard et al. 2008). When lender makes decision whether to invest in a loan requested, they may be 
influenced by the intuition or deliberate thinking. On the other hand, when people seek out 
information for selections and make investment decisions, motivation and hygiene factors lead to 
different results.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Online P2P lending has gained widely attention over the past few years. Some of the researches have 
concentrated on variables that influence funding success and interest rates of loan request (Greiner & 
Wang 2010; Herzenstein, Sonenshein, et al. 2011; Lin et al. 2013; Yum et al. 2012). Yum et al. (2012) 
explored the influence of role of the voting results and transaction history on loan funding success on 
P2P lending behavior. The results showed that borrowers tried to maintain a good reputation, and 
direct communication with lenders may adjust incorrect inference from hard data when their 
creditworthiness was questioned. Similarly, Greiner and Wang (2010) explored how trust-building 
mechanisms behave in P2P lending marketplaces. The research employed likelihood of funding and 
reduced interest rate to represent trust behaviors which revealed the importance of economic status, 
social capital and listing quality that influence trust behavior. 
 
 
Besides, there are many researches emphasizing social networks and personal characteristics. Lin et al. 
(2013) believed online friendships of borrowers acting as signals of credit quality. Research 
concentrated on analyzing friendships and discovered that friendships increased the probability of 
successful funding, lowered interest rates on funded loans, and were associated with lower ex post 
default rates.  Herzenstein, Sonenshein, et al. (2011)  examined how identity claims constructed in 
narratives by borrowers influenced lender’s decisions about unsecured personal loans. Especially, 
they used loan funding, percentage reduction in final interest rate and loan performance as dependent 
indicators to discuss the issues and found that unverifiable information affected lending decisions 
above and beyond the influence of objective, verifiable information.  
Past literature has employed various theories and frameworks to demonstrate the underlying 
phenomena. Lee and Lee (2012) empirically investigated lender’s behavior and found strong evidence 
of herding behavior and its diminishing marginal effect as bidding advances. Based on Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM), Greiner and Wang (2010) introduced trust-building mechanisms behaving 
in P2P lending marketplaces and found the importance of the central route (economic status) as the 
major driver for bidding behavior and of peripheral cues (social capital and listing quality) as trust-
building mechanisms that influence trust behavior. Considering information asymmetry, researches 
also introduced signal theory to explain P2P lending behavior. Collier and Hampshire (2010) drew on 
theory from the principle-agent perspective to empirically examine the signals that enhance 
community reputation. 
Under these circumstances, current research explores the determinants of P2P lending behavior. And 
unlike previous literature, one of the most interesting things about this study is to systematically 
analyze the underlying phenomena of P2P lending marketplaces. We bring two-factor theory and dual 
system framework as the analysis framework in order to demonstrate lenders’ choice which has little 
emerged. Besides, we use bid number as moderator to exploring the herding behavior about lender’s 
choice. Also, a brief summary on P2P research is presented as Table 1. 
 
References 
 
Dependent variables Main independent variables Supporting 
theory 
Method/data 
(Greiner & 
Wang 2010) 
 
 
Trusting behaviors 
(likelihood of funding, 
reduced interest rates) 
Economic status (central route) 
social capital, listing quality 
(peripheral cues) 
ELM 
(elaboration 
likelihood 
model) 
Data from 
Prosper.com 
(Herzenstein
, 
Sonenshein, 
et al. 2011) 
Loan funding, 
percentage reduction in 
final interest rate, loan 
performance 
Borrower’s identities 
(trustworthy, successful, 
hardworking, economic hardship, 
moral, religious) 
Identity 
claims 
Data from 
Prosper.com 
(Galak et al. 
2011) 
Loan value, time until 
loan filled 
Borrower group size, unfilled loan 
size, loan term,  field partner risk 
rating, borrower gender, borrower 
country characteristics, death rate, 
power distance, individualism, 
masculinity 
Prosocial 
lending 
Data from 
Kiva 
(Herzenstein
, Dholakia, 
et al. 2011) 
Relative time elapsed, 
number of bids 
Starting interest rate, requested 
loan amount, percent funded, 
debt-to-income ratio, 
homeownership, credit grade 
Herding 
behavior 
Date from 
Prosper.com 
(Sonenshein 
et al. 2011) 
Loan funding Credit grade, amount requested, 
maximum interest rate, 
explanation, denial, 
acknowledgment, unusual 
explanation 
Social 
account 
Data from 
Prosper.com, 
laboratory 
experiment 
(Duarte et al. 
2012) 
Likelihood of a loan 
being funded 
Trustworthiness, attractiveness, 
financial resources, credit profile 
information, listing and auction 
characteristics 
Beauty 
premium 
Data from 
Prosper.com 
(Lee & Lee Daily market share of Participation rate, number of Herding Data from 
 
 
2012) bidders, daily market 
share of bid amounts 
postings on the Q&A board, 
number of verified certificates, 
interest rate, duration for 
repayment, number of past 
auctions  
behavior Popfunding.
com 
(Yum et al. 
2012) 
Loan funding success Total number of existing 
certificates for borrower, past loan 
requests by borrower,  loan 
investments made by a borrower, 
delayed payments for the previous 
funded loan, early repayments for 
the previously funded loans, 
articles on b-board borrower 
posted in payment delay period 
Information 
asymmetry, 
herding 
behavior 
Date from 
Popfunding.
com 
(Lin et al. 
2013) 
The extent of funding Online friendship (credit quality) Signaling 
theory 
Date from 
Prosper.com 
(Gonzalez & 
Loureiro 
2014) 
Lending decision 
expressed in 
percentage 
Lender attractiveness, lender 
charisma, age, gender, image 
quality 
Decision 
heuristics 
and 
judgment 
biases,  
beauty 
premium 
Experiment 
(Burtch et al. 
2014) 
Number of lending 
transaction 
Lending actions, delta GDP, 
common language, distance, 
cultural differences, disaster, 
immigration, diversity, MFI risk 
rating, lender trust index 
Cultural and 
geographic 
distance 
related to IS 
literature 
Data from 
kiva.org  (by 
country 
analysis)  
Table 1. Summary on P2P lending research 
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 Dual System Framework 
Consumer choice can be influenced by the context. When people make decision they will evaluate 
whether the tradeoffs under consideration to be favorable or unfavorable to the options (Simonson & 
Tversky 1992). If the attributes of options are equally confident to the consumer, or the benefit of 
options is difficult to explore, more effort and attention may be paid to the information processing. 
These kinds of attribute-by-attribute evaluation and justification processing make a choice 
deliberately and consciously.  
Previous researches have emphasized human non-conscious behavior (Aarts et al. 2008; Chartrand & 
Fitzsimons 2011). This gave the theoretical explanation for consumer’s unconscious behavior. 
Sometimes consumer will choose a preference option outside awareness according to their intuitive 
feeling-a non-conscious, automatic information processing (Dhar & Gorlin 2013). Normally speaking, 
intuition and non-consciousness can be very powerful when one option dominates the other. When the 
whole attributes of option act much better than the other, consumer will spontaneously make the 
choice without deeply deliberate thinking. But the situation we often face is the benefit of attributes to 
be difficult evaluating so that we can’t choose one option just due to intuition. In fact, Epstein (1994) 
has discovered people understanding reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously 
labeled as intuitive, automatic, natural, nonverbal, narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, 
deliberative, verbal, and rational. A great breadth and depth of literature has extended the two ways to 
human decision making and proposed dual processing framework in human behavior decision (Dhar 
& Gorlin 2013; Djulbegovic et al. 2012; Gerrard et al. 2008). 
Stanovich and West (2000) coined System 1 and System 2 to represent two information processes. 
System 1 means human process information with automatic, largely unconscious, fast and 
interactional tendencies. While System 2 reveals a controlled, slow and analytic information 
 
 
processing. The distinction between System 1 and System 2 will always produce different response. 
Researches has found System 1 usually operates through the working of associative memory (Dhar & 
Gorlin 2013; Evans & Stanovich 2013). When we make a choice, sometimes we do not mean 
intentionally controlling our judgments to realize the objectives but spontaneously do the processing. 
All the behavior generated is automatic, unintentional, and fast. When System 1 performs better, 
System 2 may enhance the same outcomes, just like checking function. When consumer cannot apply 
system 1 spontaneously, judgments would mainly rely on human reasoning and analysis.  
Dhar and Gorlin (2013) believed most traditional choice heuristics are System 2 heuristics that result 
from conscious and deliberate processing. In order to simplify the decision by concentrating on some 
subset of attributes they proposed a novel dual system framework for explaining consumer preference 
construction in choice which could be descried as intuitive and deliberate framework. Intuitive 
processing can reflect consumer purchase processing which is interpreted as non-conscious, automatic 
tendencies. While deliberate processing demonstrates when consumer makes a certain choice the 
benefits and cost are difficult to evaluate so it need to be deeply analyzing and effortful processing. 
Consider, for example, the choice between options can be judged only by two attributes. Then if x 
dominates y both on the quality and price, consumer will choose x intuitively. But the situation is 
always complex and need deliberate thinking. If x has better quality and y has better price, then 
consumer will apply tradeoffs to their final choice. The decision will depend on the weights of two 
variables on the choice. To simplify the problem, the consequence can be judged by whether 
consumer is willing to pay more for better quality or not.  
In summary, when a consumer will consider the options based on their relative evaluations. That is, 
different context and task may generate various consequences. 
3.2 Two-factor Theory 
Two-factor theory originated from the research of Herzberg et al. in 1959. The theory revealed that 
most of the intrinsic aspects of the job, called motivators (e.g., achievement, recognition), accounting 
for good critical incidents. While extrinsic factors, called hygiene factors (e.g., company policy and 
administration), mainly connecting with bad critical incidents.  
Based on the fundamental inferring and propositions, documentation of the theory accompanied with 
conflicting researches (House & Wigdor 1967; King 1970; Soliman 1970). Hence, the theory was 
criticized on several grounds which could be summarized by House and Wigdor (1967). First of all, it 
was defined as methodologically bound. The argument focused on the storytelling critical-incident 
method without other methods to test the theory. Second, the contention addressed on that it was 
faulty research. Critics purported there were procedural deficiencies including the utilization of 
Herzberg's categorization procedure to measure job dimensions, the satisfiers and “hygiene factors”. 
And third, it was different with previous proofs concerning with satisfaction and motivation. One of 
the most interesting things is those studies which used the Herzberg technique or a modified form of it 
supported the motivation-hygiene theory, whereas most of the studies which used a method different 
from that of Herzberg's did not substantiate the motivation-hygiene theory (French et al. 1973; 
Soliman 1970).  
Schwab and Heneman (1970) found that recognition and achievement were the most frequently 
mentioned favorable sequence factors. And considerable effort was taken to ensure that the 
storytelling methodology was replicated faithfully. While Soliman (1970) proposed that correlation of 
responses provided no support for the motivation-hygiene theory. The results partially supported the 
hypothesis of theory and revealed that organization environment was an important mediator in 
analyzing the motivation of human working.  
One of the important findings is summarized that it is possible to replicate Herzberg's original results 
by controlling crucial aspects in the experimental process (French et al. 1973). Moreover, the theory 
and its applications remain influential in the area of organizational psychology (Furnham et al. 1999). 
In specific, two-factor theory has been applied to numerous research contexts, e.g., education, tourism 
and IT industry (DeShields Jr et al. 2005; Henry Gaziel 1986; Lundberg et al. 2009; Park & Ryoo 
 
 
2013). In the current research environment, we employ two-factor theory to describe the lenders’ 
behavior in the P2P lending marketplace which littele appeared before. The two-factor theory 
proposes to demonstrate industrial motivation, thus it attempts to explore the attitudinal determinants 
of employee behavior. The theory emphasizes the motivators are typically intrinsic factors which are 
part of job content and are largely administered by the employee (DeShields Jr et al. 2005), while 
hygiene factors are extrinsic factors. The most critical thing to understand this theory is distinguishing 
the difference of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Briefly, the opposite of satisfaction is no satisfaction, 
but not dissatisfaction. In the meantime, the opposite of dissatisfaction is no dissatisfaction, but not 
satisfaction. As mentioned above, motivation factors tend to be more often for good critical incidents, 
while hygiene factors are more often connected with bad critical incidents. Once the intrinsic, positive 
emotion dominates others, it is possible to enhance continuous working efficiency which may perform 
as satisfaction. On the other hand, although the extrinsic factors can improve working efficiency, it 
significantly behaves when they are absence, which may contribute to dissatisfaction. Hence, in the 
P2P lending context, motivators refer to information about relevant and potential revenue, whereas 
hygiene factors are defined as information about credit quality which may connect with foreseeable 
and potential risks. 
With above analysis, if we cross-combine dual system framework and two-factor theory to explore 
human motivation under two typical information processes, then four dimensions of heuristic 
processing can be demonstrated: motivation with deliberate processing, motivation with intuitive 
processing, hygiene with deliberate processing and hygiene with intuitive processing. In order to 
simplify, we also called those dimensions as quadrant 1, 2, 3 and 4. These four information 
motivation and processes consist of our research framework. 
4 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS 
The aim of this article is to analyze lenders’ decision-making in online peer-to-peer lending 
marketplaces. In order to obtain observable data, we use the auction as the unit of analysis. Since the 
status of auctions (success or failure) can reflect the real opinion of every participating lender, using 
the auction as the unit of analysis is quite appropriate. And the heterogeneous characteristics of each 
lender are also eliminated by using this unit of analysis (Yum et al. 2012). 
As mentioned above, dual system framework can describe human choice heuristics (Dhar & Gorlin 
2013; Djulbegovic et al. 2012; Gerrard et al. 2008; Stanovich & West 2000), while two-factor theory 
demonstrates intrinsic and extrinsic factors of things (DeShields Jr et al. 2005; Henry Gaziel 1986; 
Park & Ryoo 2013). When we cross-combine these two theories, the framework established can 
distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic factors with different human choice heuristic processing which is 
consistent with our research topic. Considering peer-to-peer lending environment, motivation factors 
are related to revenue which contributes to lenders’ profit. While we defined hygiene factors as 
information about credit quality which connected with foreseeable and potential risk. Without them 
may lead to bad critical results. So, all the factors which are effective contribution in this dimension 
should be positive to the success of bid funding. That is to say, the coefficients of significant factors 
in quadrant 3 and 4 should be positive ones. On the other hand, people make lending choice mainly by 
two heuristic ways. One is non-conscious, automatic processing; the other is to be deeply analyzing 
and effortful processing. The former don’t need too much thinking, we will certainly get the suitable 
solution. But the latter do need some deliberate analyzing and thinking. As a lender, when they make 
decision whether to bid on a certain auction, they are more interesting in bid itself rather than 
borrowers who submit the loan request. So it do spend them much more time in deliberate thinking 
and analyzing the bid. Hence, we categorize information about auction itself into deliberate 
processing, while others about borrowers are defined as intuitive processing.  
According to the framework we established, we divide borrow amount, PPDAI interest rate and loan 
duration into quadrant 1. Secondly, we consider vouch status, credit grade, whether draw back 
borrowed money and whether join in “advanced plan” as variables in quadrant 3 because those factors 
are the information about auction itself, without which may lead to potential risk. Finally, number of 
friends and certifications are information of borrowers which should be categorized into intuitive 
 
 
processing dimension. In specific, friendships can increase the probability of successful funding (Lin 
et al. 2013). Hence, lenders are convinced that friendships can make a successful auction which may 
bring revenue. While lack of certifications may bring them much more risk in making lending choice. 
So we divide these two factors into quadrant 2 and 4. Based on above discussions, a research 
framework is proposed as Table 2. 
 
 Deliberate processing Intuitive processing 
Motivation factors Borrow amount (BrwAmt) 
PPDAI interest rate (PPDaiIR) 
Loan duration (LoanDuration) 
Number of friends (NumFrid) 
Hygiene factors Vouch status (Vouch) 
Credit grade (CreditGrade) 
Whether draw back borrowed money 
(IsDrwBck) 
Whether join in “advanced plan” 
(IsAdvPln) 
Number of certifications 
(NumOfCer) 
Table 2. Research framework in P2P lending 
With the above research framework, we can explore online peer-to-peer lending behavior 
systematically by heuristic analysis. For every auction, we divide detailed information into different 
dimensions. Besides, we include some control variables to exclude interference effect. An interesting 
thing is that we use bid number as moderator to test lenders’ herding behavior. Hence, a research 
model is posited as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Research model  
When lenders consider whether to invest an auction, it is important for them to distinguish the details 
of bids and the borrowers’ credit characteristics. Borrow amount, interest rate and loan duration are 
detailed features of an auction. When lenders consider whether to choose a bid, they will pay much 
attention to consider a few questions, such as how much borrowers want, how time they will pay back 
and how about their revenue. According to Lee and Lee (2012), the starting interest rate and payback 
period influenced loan funding success. Prior researches have indicated higher interest rates, and 
lower requested amount are more likely to receive bids (Greiner & Wang 2010; Herzenstein, Dholakia, 
et al. 2011). Also, no matter how high the interest rate, the attractiveness of an investment is 
diminished with a long payback period (Lee & Lee 2012). Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1 An auction with more borrow amount is less likely successful. 
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Hypothesis 2 An auction with more interest rate is more likely successful. 
Hypothesis 3 An auction with a shorter payback period is more likely successful. 
Lee and Lee (2012) emphasized that an auction with more verified certification attracts more bids. In 
our research, more certifications, which refer to whether borrowers are verified by photo, mobile 
phone number, diploma or video, can enhance the persuasion that those bids are more reliable and 
credible for investing. Similarly, if the auction is guaranteed by some creditable people or the official 
institution, lenders will be more confident in investing the bid which explains as vouch status in our 
research. Also, when lender takes investment plan into account, the credit grade of an auction is quite 
important. Past literature has demonstrated that the higher the credit grade, the more possible auctions 
being funded (Greiner & Wang 2010; Herzenstein, Dholakia, et al. 2011). So, we posit: 
Hypothesis 4 An auction with more number of certifications is more likely successful. 
Hypothesis 5 An auction with vouch is more likely successful. 
Hypothesis 6 An auction with higher credit grade is more likely successful. 
Lin et al. (2013) proposed that friendships increased the probability of successful funding. Online 
number of friends in P2P lending behaves as signals of credit. More friends may reflect higher degree 
of centrality of a borrower in a social network. It delivers a strong signal that borrower is honest, 
friendly and trustworthy to some degree. So, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7 The friendship of an auction is positive to successful funding. 
Based on the specific peer-to-peer lending platform-PPDAI which is famous and typical in China, we 
employ some more specific information. An auction can be labeled as whether to make borrow 
amount into cash, or whether to participate in advanced plan which may enjoy some excellent 
functions in the official platform. Those two factors may give guarantee or privilege to borrowers, 
such as displaying in the homepage of official platform, so that making different use experience for 
lenders. We suppose: 
Hypothesis 8 An auction with “draw back” plan is more likely successful. 
Hypothesis 9 An auction with “advanced” plan is more likely successful. 
In order to observe successful auction clearly, we regard status of bid list as dependent variable. An 
interesting thing is that we employ bid number to explore lenders’ herding behavior. More bids on a 
certain auction may contribute to herding behavior, which has been confirmed by past literature 
(Herzenstein, Dholakia, et al. 2011; Lee & Lee 2012). Unlike previous researches, we use bid number 
as a moderator to discuss the relationships between factors and successful auctions, which is an 
interesting and attractive research question. Key variables are summarized as Table 3. 
 
Variable Description 
StmtList Statement of the bid list (success or fail) 
BrwAmt Borrow amount 
PPDaiIR Setting interest rate 
LoanDuration Duration for repayment of auction by the borrower (months) 
Vouch Whether someone vouch for the listing 
CreditGrade What’s the credit grade for the auction 
IsDrwBck Whether draw back the borrowed money 
IsAdvPln Whether join in the "advanced plan" 
NumFrid Number of friends of borrower connected with an auction 
NumOfCer Number of certifications of borrower connected with an auction 
BidNum Number of bid for an auction 
Table 3. Description of key variables 
 
 
5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The objective of our research is to analyze online P2P lending behavior. Based on the data collected 
from PPDAI, we launch an empirically exploration. Since dependent variable is binary factor, we use 
SPSS 21 to apply logistic and hierarchical linear regression analysis. 
In this research, we collected data of PPDAI from January, 2011 to June, 2011. In order to obtain 
effective data, we selected all of loan requests information which was relevant to our study. The 
descriptive statistics of key variables is shown as Table 4. 
During this period, 7793 unique auctions were used as a big and creditable research sample. Among 
those data, there were 3091 successful auctions. Hence, exploring successful auctions are quite 
confident and reliable. 
 
Variable BrwAm
t 
PPDa
iIR 
Loan
Durat
ion 
Vouc
h 
Credi
tGrad
e 
IsDr
wBck 
IsAdv
Pln 
Num
Frid 
Num
OfCe
r 
BidN
um 
N 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 7793 
Mean 5891.66 17.85 6.31 .06 2.50 .09 .22 22.43 3.70 19.59 
Median 3300.00 20.00 6.00 .00 2.00 .00 .00 7.00 4.00 16.00 
S.D. 8417.96 4.27 3.42 .24 .87 .29 .42 47.59 1.04 21.09 
Min. 3000 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 
Max. 200000 25 12 1 6 1 1 559 5 323 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
We use hierarchical linear analysis to discuss P2P lending behavior. In this research, we contain 3 
control variables (Gender, Age, IsMarry) to eliminate any other interference factors. In model 1, we 
only include control factors to examine the control effect. In model 2, we add independent variables to 
test the fit of model and independent effect. In model 3, moderator is employed to verify the fit of 
whole model. For the last model, we include interaction effect of moderator and independent variables 
to examine the moderating effect. 
Table 5 represents the results of statistics analysis when statement of bid list acts as dependent 
variable. Since the dependent variable is binary factor, we use logistic regression analysis to explain 
the relationships. In model 1, all of the control variables are significant. It means those control factors 
behave well to represent other interference effect. Model 2 reveals that independent variables perform 
well in describing the statement of bid list. In Model 3, we introduce moderator into regression 
equation and find good fit of model. 
In model 4, most of the effect of independent variables and moderator are significant except borrow 
amount and “IsDrwBck”. For lenders, they provide capital support just to make sure that borrowers 
can return back no matter whether they change the status of funding. So, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 
8 was rejected. Secondly, if we observe the coefficients of borrow amount, interest rate and loan 
duration, we will find all of the factors in motivation with deliberate processing have negative effect 
to the success of bid, although the effect of borrow amount is not so significant. That is to say, 
hypothesis 3 is supported while hypothesis 2 send reverse signal. We may be curious about the result 
of hypothesis 2, which may be different from Lee and Lee (2012).Why does this interesting thing 
happen? In actually, higher interest rate is good for lenders but harmful to borrowers. The higher 
interest rate borrowers set, lenders will be more likely and happier to provide their money, but it may 
be not the same for borrowers. We explore the raw data in detail, and find there are 1157 auctions 
returned back by borrowers which accounts for 24.6% failed listings. Borrowers may feel stressful for 
higher interest rate after they put bids on website so that they draw back the bid lists. Besides, in this 
research we suppose all the lenders are rational and reasonable to some degree. The extremely high 
interest rate may send a reverse and uncertain signal to lenders so that they don’t support bid lists. 
And we collected date from PPDAI which reveals that Chinese lenders’ behavior may be different and 
unique from other country. Those reasons may explain the negative effect of interest rate. Thirdly, we 
investigate the coefficients of vouch, credit grade and IsAdvPln, and notice that all of these factors 
 
 
about the hygiene facets with deliberate processing are quite positive and signification to the 
successful actions. These conditions support hypothesis 5, 6, and 9. Finally, for the last two variables, 
the coefficients of number of verified certifications and online friends are also positively significant 
which support hypothesis 4 and 7, which is consistent with some past literature (Lee & Lee 2012; Lin 
et al. 2013). 
 
MODEL 1  
Nagelkerke R2=0.069 
MODEL 2 
Nagelkerke R2=0.530 
MODEL 3 
Nagelkerke R2=0.561 
MODEL 4 
Nagelkerke R2=0.573 
Variabl
es B Sig. 
Variab
les B Sig 
Variab
les B Sig Variables B Sig 
Gender 0.221 0.002 Gender 0.406 0.000 Gender 0.381 0.000 Gender 0.364 0.000 
Age 0.414 0.000 Age 0.120 0.017 Age 0.127 0.013 Age 0.126 0.015 
IsMarr
y 0.496 0.000 
IsMarr
y 0.240 0.001 
IsMarr
y 0.259 0.000 IsMarry 0.259 0.000 
Consta
nt 
-
1.559 0.000 
BrwA
mt 0.114 0.005 
BrwA
mt 
-
0.133 0.002 BrwAmt 
-
0.088 0.081 
      
PPDaiI
R 
-
0.519 0.000 
PPDaiI
R 
-
0.449 0.000 PPDaiIR 
-
0.404 0.000 
    
  LoanD
uration 
-
0.186 
0.000 LoanDuration 
-
0.163 0.000 
LoanDurat
ion 
-
0.149 0.000 
      Vouch 1.282 0.000 Vouch 1.604 0.000 Vouch 1.412 0.000 
      
Credit
Grade 1.474 0.000 
Credit
Grade 1.325 0.000 
CreditGrad
e 1.355 0.000 
      
IsDrw
Bck 
-
0.511 0.000 
IsDrw
Bck 
-
0.254 0.035 IsDrwBck 
-
0.176 0.168 
      
IsAdv
Pln 0.387 0.000 
IsAdv
Pln 0.300 0.000 IsAdvPln 0.300 0.000 
      
NumFr
id 0.343 0.000 
NumFr
id 0.342 0.000 NumFrid 0.352 0.000 
      
NumO
fCer 0.431 0.000 
NumO
fCer 0.355 0.000 NumOfCer 0.304 0.000 
      
Consta
nt 
-
4.951 0.000 
BidNu
m 0.780 0.000 BidNum 1.863 0.000 
    
  
    
  Consta
nt 
-
4.629 0.000 
BrwAmt_
BidNum 
-
0.006 0.703 
    
  
    
        PPDaiIR_BidNum 
-
0.246 0.000 
    
  
    
        
LoanDurat
ion_BidNu
m 
0.151 0.001 
  
 
  
    Vouch_BidNum 
-
1.158 0.000 
  
 
  
    CreditGrade_BidNum 
-
0.313 0.000 
  
 
  
    IsDrwBck_BidNum 0.210 0.267 
  
 
  
    IsAdvPln_BidNum 
-
0.226 0.012 
  
 
  
    NumOfCer_BidNum 
-
0.215 0.002 
 
 
  
 
  
    NumFrid_BidNum 
-
0.059 0.277 
  
 
  
       
  
 
  
    Constant -4.647 0.000 
Table 5. Status of bid list as dependent variable 
Comparing with model 3 and model 4, we find “Nagelkerke R square” increase that reveals there is 
moderating effect existing. Moreover, we find bid number behaves well in most relationships except 
the borrow amount, “IsDrwBck” and number of friends. The more bids on an auction, the stronger 
herding behavior. Number of bids send a signal that how many people are confident in an auction. 
Table 6 concludes the related result. When more people bid on current auction, other lenders’ 
influence becomes much more important. At this time, the influence of higher interest rate resulting in 
lower success rate eliminates. More people’s bids behavior seems a visible assurance. It will weaken 
the original guarantee condition, such as vouch status, credit grade and number of certifications. 
Besides, more bids on an auction will promote the relationship of shorter duration contributing to 
successful auction. That is to say, although there is strong herding behavior, people are still concerns 
about loan duration. 
 
Borrow amount (BrwAmt) 
-  PPDAI interest rate (PPDaiIR) *** 
+  Loan duration (LoanDuration)*** 
Number of friends (NumFrid) 
-  Vouch status (Vouch) *** 
-  Credit grade (CreditGrade) *** 
Whether draw back borrowed money 
(IsDrwBck) 
-  Whether join in “advanced plan” (IsAdvPln) 
*** 
-  Number of certifications (NumOfCer) *** 
Note: *** means significant moderating effect; “+” represents positive moderating effect, “-” 
represents negative moderating effect 
Table 6. Moderating effect between StmtList and independent variables 
In order to understand moderating effect more explicitly, we introduce Figure 2 to analyze the 
moderating effecting between independent variables and dependent variable. First of all, we make all 
the independent variables and moderator be standardized to simplify the calculation process. As a 
sample evaluation, we will investigate when bid number changes (average ± standard deviation), what 
will happen on those variables. In specific, the variables BrwAmt, IsDrwBck and NumFrid are 
removed from the analysis since those factors are insignificant on dependent variable. Secondly, we 
establish logistic regression analysis on every significant variable. However, we found the fit of 
model for loan duration can’t reach the standard so we exclude the analysis of this one.  
Figure 2 (a) represents the relationship of interest rate and status of bid list when bid number reach 
different level. We can find that large interest rate results in less possibility of biding on auction. 
When more people bid on auction, the influence of higher interest rate resulting in lower success rate 
eliminates. Figure 2 (b)-(e) shows positive relationship between independent variables and dependent 
variable which is consitent with above discussion. Figure 2 (b) to (e) reveals when more people bid on 
an auction, the affect of vouch status, credit grade, advanced plan and number of certifications on 
“StmtList” weakens. When more people bid on auction, the efficacy of original promise (i.e., vouch, 
credit grade, number of certifications) recedes. The influence of advanced plan also acts in a similar 
way. Although we introduce same level of bid number to test moderating effect, different variables 
shows different sensitivity. Especially, we notice the dependent variable is a binary factor, so we just 
use Figure 2 to describe the tendency of dependent variable when independent variables change.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Moderating effect between independent variables and StmtList 
6 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this research concentrates on lenders’ behavior of peer-to-peer lending marketplaces. 
This is very important for analyzing lender’s decision making process, during which we can 
summarize some useful implications from the empirical research results. 
Generalizing the statistics analysis, we can find most of hypotheses are supported except hypothesis 1, 
8, while hypothesis 2 behaves significantly negative. We can find all the factors in hygiene dimension 
are positive no matter they are significant or not. In actual, we categorize information about risk into 
quadrant 3 and 4. All those factors will not directly increase lender’s benefit, but it deliver guarantee 
and confident to lenders for attracting more bids. So borrowers should introduce more credit 
guarantee for bids and borrowers themselves to make lenders believe the bids are safe enough.  
There are also some contributions in this research. The first contribution of this article is to establish a 
systematical framework to analyze every auction information, with which we extent our research to a 
new field. If we look into the data analysis explicitly, we will find most of the coefficients of 
significant deliberate processing factors are bigger than intuitive processing factors. That is to say, for 
lenders’ decision making, the former variables are more influential than latter ones. Actually, when 
lenders get enough information to make choice, they will rely on deliberate thinking instead of just 
making intuitive judgment. The specific information of an auction is more important than borrower’s 
characteristics to a large degree. It sends a signal to borrowers that setting good and appropriate 
conditions of an auction is much more important than obtaining other credit certifications. Secondly, 
we also find the hygiene variables behave strong positive effect which is consistent with above 
discussion. Just as mentioned above, we labelled information about credit quality which connected 
 
 
with risk as hygiene factors. With those factors lenders will be more confident in making decisions. It 
represents the credit of auctions and borrowers. Therefore, hygiene variables send positive signals to 
lenders. Finally, we employ bid number as moderator to explore influence in P2P lending behavior 
which hardly emerged. Most of the moderating effect is significant. With more people bid on auction, 
potential lenders will obtain a creditable signal to be more likely lending their money. So, most of the 
moderating effect eliminates the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. 
It reveals that if borrowers get enough bids, potential lenders will participate in the auction more 
positive since they may ignore some essential conditions. 
We can also find some limitations in the current research. First of all, we collect date from PPDAI 
which may perform unique characteristics. Hence, the generalizability may be limited. Secondly, we 
capture some typical features in PPDAI which may be not enough. Including more specific 
information about auctions in the following study is quite significant. Finally, in order to get 
observable data, we set P2P platform as controllable variable. In the future research, exploring loan 
behavior of different platforms may give us new inspiration. 
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